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 INGE GEYSKENS, JAN-BENEDICT E.M. STEENKAMP, and NIRMALYA KUMAR*
 The authors advance a conceptual model of channel member satisfac-
 tion that distinguishes between economic and noneconomic satisfaction.
 The resulting model then is tested using meta-analysis. Meta-analysis
 enables the empirical investigation of a model involving several con-
 structs that never have been examined simultaneously within an individ-
 ual study. More specifically, the authors unify the stream of research on
 power use-the focus of many satisfaction studies in the 1970s and
 1980s-with more recent work on trust and commitment, which usually
 explores antecedents other than power use. The results indicate that eco-
 nomic satisfaction and noneconomic satisfaction are distinct constructs
 with differential relationships to various antecedents and consequences.
 Furthermore, this study demonstrates that satisfaction is both conceptu-
 ally and empirically separable from the related constructs of trust
 and commitment.
 A Meta-Analysis of Satisfaction in Marketing
 Channel Relationships
 During the past three decades, channel relationships have
 been an important area of research in marketing. Empirical
 investigations of channel relationships have focused on pre-
 dicting several rich and interesting constructs such as power
 use, conflict, satisfaction, opportunism, and, more recently,
 trust and commitment. Of these, a literature search indicates
 that the most popular construct in empirical studies is satis-
 faction, with 71 studies between 1970 and 1996 incorporat-
 ing satisfaction in their models of channel relationships.
 This is consistent with the position taken by various
 researchers who posit satisfaction as a focal consequence of
 channel relationships (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990; Fra-
 zier 1983b).
 The construct of satisfaction is of fundamental impor-
 tance in understanding channel relationships (Ruekert and
 Churchill 1984). Satisfaction affects channel members'
 morale and resulting incentive to participate in collective
 activities (Schul, Little, and Pride 1985). It helps in devel-
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 oping integrated logistics management and just-in-time
 inventory systems (Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1991). Satis-
 fied channel members are less prone to exit the channel, less
 inclined to file lawsuits against other channel members, and
 not as likely to seek protective legislation (Hunt and Nevin
 1974). Thus, Dwyer (1980) views channel member satisfac-
 tion as the key to long-run channel viability.
 Despite the importance of and the vast empirical research
 attention devoted to satisfaction in channel relationships,
 several unresolved issues remain. First, there is no consen-
 sus regarding the conceptualization and measurement of
 channel member satisfaction. Some researchers (e.g.,
 Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1991) take an economic view of
 satisfaction, defining it as the perceived discrepancy
 between prior expectations and actual profits. Others regard
 satisfaction in more noneconomic, psychosocial terms,
 defining it as an emotional response to the overall working
 relationship with the channel partner (e.g., Anderson and
 Narus 1984; Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 1990). Second, the
 71 empirical studies relate satisfaction to more than 80 dif-
 ferent variables, often with inconsistent findings across
 studies. Therefore, it would be helpful to establish the gen-
 eralizability of the relationships between satisfaction and the
 constructs to which it is most frequently related while
 embedding them within an overall conceptual framework.
 Third, in more recent years, satisfaction often has been
 replaced by trust and/or commitment as the focal conse-
 quence(s) of channel relationships (e.g., Anderson and
 Weitz 1989, 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994). However, there
 has been little attempt to elaborate if and how satisfaction
 differs conceptually and empirically from trust and commit-
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 ment. To help resolve these issues, we embark on a meta-
 analysis of the channel member satisfaction literature.1
 Miller and Pollock (1995) observe that meta-analysis may
 be used for two different research objectives: (1) relating
 variability in study outcomes across the research stream to
 different methodological features of individual studies or
 (2) testing substantive hypotheses based on evidence aggre-
 gated across the research stream, including hypotheses that
 have not been considered previously in primary-level
 research. We refer to these as Type I and Type 2 studies,
 respectively. Although both types of meta-analysis use the
 same basic strategy of coding and aggregating information
 from results of individual studies, they are different in the
 manner in which they use this information to contribute to
 the literature.
 In a Type I study, meta-analysis is the only technique that
 can appropriately address the issue of how methodological
 characteristics of studies affect research findings. For exam-
 ple, to the best of our knowledge, the only existing meta-
 analysis in the channels area is our recent investigation
 (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1998), in which we
 focus on how the level of bivariate correlations between
 trust and other relationship constructs is affected by method-
 ological and substantive characteristics. The results demon-
 strate that the use of experiments, samples drawn from mul-
 tiple industries, and U.S. data produced larger effects. Using
 the Political Economy Framework, the correlation between
 trust and channel sentiments and actions was found to be
 particularly high. More generally in marketing, the studies
 reviewed by Farley, Lehmann, and Sawyer (1995) are other
 examples of such Type I meta-analyses.
 In a Type 2 study, meta-analysis is "merely" a tool,
 because the same questions also could have been addressed
 by collecting primary data. However, meta-analysis is a
 more powerful technique because it allows for empirical
 generalizations (Farley, Lehmann, and Sawyer 1995). This
 study is a Type 2 meta-analysis. Therefore, similar to other
 empirical articles in the channels area, we develop our
 hypotheses up front. These hypotheses flow out of a con-
 ceptual model of the antecedents and consequences of chan-
 nel member satisfaction, organized along a structure-
 conduct-outcomes (SCO) framework. Then, instead of pri-
 mary data, we use meta-analysis to test our hypotheses.
 Through this study, we aim to contribute to the channels
 literature in the following ways: First, we add to the con-
 temporary state of knowledge about channel member satis-
 faction by investigating the generality of individual study
 findings and establishing several empirical generalizations.
 Second, our model investigates constructs that have not
 been empirically investigated simultaneously within an indi-
 vidual study. More specifically, we unify the stream of
 research on power use-the focus of many satisfaction stud-
 ies in the 1970s and 1980s-with more recent work on trust
 and commitment, which usually explores antecedents other
 than power use. Third, we distinguish between economic
 and noneconomic satisfaction and examine the extent to
 which they are related differentially to various antecedents
 and consequences. Fourth, we examine whether satisfaction
 is conceptually and empirically distinct from the related
 constructs of trust and commitment.
 IFor an excellent discussion of the meta-analysis technique, see Farley
 and Lehmann (1986).
 The article is organized as follows: We begin with a the-
 ory section in which we propose a conceptual model of
 channel member satisfaction; define the constructs of satis-
 faction, trust, and commitment; and develop hypotheses
 relating economic and noneconomic satisfaction to various
 key antecedents and consequences. Then, we present the
 research method and data analysis procedure. Subsequently,
 we report the results. Finally, we conclude with implications
 and suggestions for further research.
 THEORY
 Channel Member Satisfaction
 Channel member satisfaction is defined most frequently
 as a positive affective state resulting from the appraisal of all
 aspects of a firm's working relationship with another firm
 (e.g., Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Gaski and Nevin 1985).
 Consequently, according to this view, satisfaction should
 capture both economic and noneconomic psychosocial
 aspects (Gassenheimer et al. 1994). The proportion of eco-
 nomic and noneconomic items included in the satisfaction
 scale, however, varies considerably across studies.
 Conceptually, the extent to which a satisfaction scale cap-
 tures the economic versus noneconomic dimension should
 have an impact in terms of both the antecedents that affect
 satisfaction as well as the consequences fostered by satis-
 faction. Therefore, we distinguish between two types of sat-
 isfaction, that is, satisfaction focusing primarily on eco-
 nomic aspects of the relationship (which we label "eco-
 nomic satisfaction") and satisfaction focusing primarily on
 more noneconomic aspects of the relationship (which we
 label "noneconomic satisfaction").
 Economic satisfaction is defined as a channel member's
 positive affective response to the economic rewards that
 flow from the relationship with its partner, such as sales vol-
 ume and margins. An economically satisfied channel mem-
 ber considers the relationship a success with respect to goal
 attainment. It is satisfied with the general effectiveness and
 productivity of the relationship with its partner, as well as
 with the resulting financial outcomes.
 Noneconomic satisfaction is defined as a channel mem-
 ber's positive affective response to the noneconomic, psy-
 chosocial aspects of its relationship, in that interactions with
 the exchange partner are fulfilling, gratifying, and easy (e.g.,
 Dwyer and Gassenheimer 1992; Mohr, Fisher, and Nevin
 1996). A channel member satisfied with the noneconomic
 aspects of the relationship appreciates the contacts with its
 partner and, on a personal level, likes working with it
 because it believes the partner is concerned, respectful, and
 willing to exchange ideas.
 Satisfaction in a Structure-Conduct-Outcomes Framework
 We use an SCO framework to help understand the role of
 satisfaction in marketing channels (cf. Molm 1990).
 Channel structure refers to the patterned or regularized
 aspects of relationships between channel participants; con-
 duct refers to strategies and patterns of behavior that emerge
 in a relationship; and outcomes refer to relational, qualita-
 tive outcomes that result from the relationship. The SCO
 framework posits a causal sequence, in that structure leads
 to conduct, which in turn determines outcomes. According
 to the SCO framework, for a complete understanding of a
 224
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 construct, we should consider all three types of constructs in
 relation to one another, because widely divergent conduct
 may follow from given structural conditions (and thus,
 structure-outcomes relationships are situation-specific and
 not generalizable to new settings unless conduct is taken
 into account) or varying qualities of outcomes may result
 from presumably similar conduct patterns (and thus, con-
 duct-outcomes relationships are situation-specific and not
 generalizable to new settings unless structure is taken into
 account).
 Figure 1 presents our model of channel member satisfac-
 tion, organized along the principles of the SCO framework.
 Channel member satisfaction, conflict, trust, and commit-
 ment repeatedly have been referred to and explored as chan-
 nel outcomes (e.g., Frazier 1983b; Mohr and Nevin 1990).
 As previously indicated, we distinguish between economic
 and noneconomic satisfaction. Researchers have tried to
 predict these outcome variables from both structural and
 behavioral (conduct) constructs in the channel. Structural
 constructs that have figured prominently in channel member
 satisfaction investigations are dependence/power (e.g.,
 Keith, Jackson, and Crosby 1990; Skinner and Guiltinan
 1985), as well as centralization and formalization (e.g.,
 Dwyer and Oh 1987a; Phillips 1982). The most pervasive
 channel member conduct construct that has been identified
 as an important determinant of channel member satisfaction
 is partner's use of power, and the most popular typology of
 power use distinguishes between coercive and noncoercive
 influence strategies (e.g., Frazier and Rody 1991; Gaski and
 Nevin 1985).
 Outcomes
 Conflict represents the level of tension, frustration, and
 disagreement in the relationship (Anderson and Narus 1990;
 Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989) when one channel member
 perceives that another channel member is engaged in behav-
 ior that is preventing or impeding it from achieving its goals
 (Gaski and Nevin 1985). Trust frequently is described as the
 extent to which a firm believes that its exchange partner is
 honest and/or benevolent (e.g., Kumar, Scheer, and
 Steenkamp 1995a). Trust in the partner's honesty refers to
 the firm's belief that the partner will keep its promises,
 whereas trust in the partner's benevolence refers to the
 belief that the partner is interested in the firm's welfare
 (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995b). Commitment is a
 desire to continue the relationship in the future and a will-
 ingness to make short-term sacrifices to maintain the rela-
 tionship (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1992).
 Noneconomic satisfaction, trust, and commitment: Simi-
 lar or divergent constructs? Given its negative valence and
 behavioral aspects, conflict seems quite distinct from the
 other four outcome variables. Similarly, given its economic
 nature, economic satisfaction appears easily separable from
 the other outcome constructs. However, whether noneco-
 nomic satisfaction, trust, and commitment are separate, dis-
 tinct constructs is less straightforward. It is conceivable that
 they all tap into some generalized positive affect. Published
 channel studies that directly address questions about the dis-
 tinction among noneconomic satisfaction, trust, and com-
 mitment are scarce.
 According to Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987), relationships
 evolve through five general phases: (I) awareness, (2) explo-
 ration, (3) expansion, (4) commitment, and (5) dissolution.
 Each phase represents a major transition in how parties regard
 one another. Whereas perceptions of noneconomic satisfac-
 tion and the honesty component of trust are formed during the
 exploration phase of relationship development, the rudiments
 of benevolence are not established until channel relationships
 enter the expansion phase, that is, the phase in which parties
 form expectations for promising future interactions (Dwyer,
 Schurr, and Oh 1987; Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna 1985).
 Commitment does not develop fully until relationships enter
 the fourth and most advanced phase of buyer-seller relation-
 ship development, the commitment phase, which is charac-
 terized by parties purposefully engaging resources to main-
 tain their relationship (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987).
 Why do these constructs develop at different points in
 time of a relationship? There is a developmental progression
 in terms of the time and emotional investment required to
 establish each construct and what it demands in terms of the
 level of abstraction (Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna 1985). The
 degree of a firm's noneconomic satisfaction and its percep-
 tion of its partner's honesty are associated largely with spe-
 cific and tangible aspects of the relationship and, therefore,
 form more rapidly than do benevolence and commitment
 (Porter et al. 1974). Benevolence and commitment require a
 channel member to make a more comprehensive assessment
 of its relationship on the basis of abstract expectations and
 projections into the future (Kumar 1996), and thereby
 require more time (Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna 1985). In
 particular, because commitment requires a member to think
 in fairly comprehensive terms about the relationship
 (Williams and Hazer 1986) and represents the highest stage
 of emotional and economic resources invested in the rela-
 tionship (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987), a relatively signifi-
 cant period of time must elapse before a channel member
 becomes truly committed to its partner (Porter et al. 1974).
 Using the preceding reasoning as a basis, we hypothesize
 the following:
 H : Noneconomic satisfaction, trust, and commitment are mean-
 ingful as separate, distinct channel constructs.
 Interrelationships among outcome variables. Although
 several individual studies have examined two or more of our
 five outcome variables-economic satisfaction, noneco-
 nomic satisfaction, conflict, trust, and commitment-there
 is no consensus on the causal ordering of these five con-
 structs. Although we acknowledge the potential for two-way
 relationships, in Figure I we delineate a causal structure of
 the process through which the five relationship outcomes
 nfluence one another. The basis of the causal ordering is our
 previous conceptual discussion on the differences between
 the outcome constructs and the channels literature.
 Because members join marketing channels to create eco-
 nomic value for themselves, conflict in channel relation-
 ships is most likely to occur over economic issues and in the
 face of economic dissatisfaction by the parties. Channel
 members that are highly satisfied with the economic
 rewards that flow from their relationship will perceive their
 partner as advancing their goal achievement, as opposed to
 impeding or preventing it. This should reduce the level of
 disagreements and conflict in the relationship.
 Conflict negatively affects trust both directly and indi-
 rectly through noneconomic satisfaction. Conflict generally
 225
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Fri, 18 Aug 2017 02:07:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Figure 1
 ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC SATISFACTION IN A STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK
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 is believed to be causally antecedent to noneconomic satis-
 faction (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990). Relational dis-
 agreements tend to elicit frustration, thereby causing feel-
 ings of unpleasantness and noneconomic dissatisfaction
 about the relationship and, eventually, distrust toward the
 partner.
 Our model posits a sequential one-way causal flow from
 noneconomic satisfaction to trust to commitment. The ratio-
 nale for this lies primarily in Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh's
 (1987) pioneering article on relationship development,
 which adopts a longitudinal perspective on channel relation-
 ships. As we previously argued, noneconomic satisfaction,
 trust, and commitment are formed during subsequent phases
 of relationship development. On this basis, we hypothesize
 that noneconomic satisfaction (which develops in the short
 run and is a report of past interactions) positively influences
 trust (which takes relatively longer to develop and has a
 more expectational quality to it), which in turn positively
 affects commitment (which develops in the long run and is
 future-oriented) (cf. Williams and Hazer 1986). Consider-
 able conceptual and empirical evidence favors the conclu-
 sion that commitment is the ultimate outcome in channel
 relationships, with causal precedence of conflict, satisfac-
 tion, and trust (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1992; Morgan and
 Hunt 1994). A meta-analysis by aggregating the evidence
 from several studies should help establish the generality of
 this sequence. We hypothesize the following:
 H2a: Greater levels of economic satisfaction decrease conflict.
 H2b: Greater levels of conflict decrease noneconomic satisfaction.
 H2c: Greater levels of conflict decrease trust.
 H2d: Greater levels of noneconomic satisfaction foster trust.
 H2e: Greater levels of trust foster commitment.
 Conduct
 The most pervasive channel member conduct construct
 that has been identified as a determinant of channel member
 satisfaction is use of power, usually referred to as "influence
 strategies." For the most part, channels researchers have dis-
 tinguished between coercive and noncoercive influence
 strategies. Conceptualizations of coercive influence strate-
 gies typically include threats and promises (e.g., Frazier and
 Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1986).2 Threats are used
 when the source implies to the target that failure to perform
 or behave in the desired way will result in negative sanc-
 tions or punishments. Promises are used when the source
 implies that it will provide the target with specific rewards
 or benefits, contingent on the target's compliance with the
 source's desires. In the social psychological literature (e.g.,
 French and Raven 1959), promises are not regarded as a
 coercive influence strategy because they draw on reward
 power. However, Frazier and Summers (1984, 1986)
 explore promises as a coercive influence strategy because,
 similar to threats, promises do not attempt to alter the tar-
 get's perceptions of the inherent desirability of the intended
 2A third coercive influence strategy is the use of legal legitimate power
 (i.e., legitimate power based on contractual agreements). A large number of
 researchers have not distinguished the use of legal legitimate power, which
 is a coercive influence strategy, from the use of traditional legitimate power
 (i.e., legitimate power based on social norms and values), which is a non-
 coercive influence strategy. Because of this interpretational confounding,
 we do not include the use of legitimate power in our meta-analysis.
 behavioral response. Furthermore, as Frazier and Rody
 (1991) observe, these are contingent influence strategies in
 which the action (punishment or reward) of the source
 depends on the target's response (compliance or noncompli-
 ance). Consistent with this, Frazier's data in several studies
 indicate that threats and promises load onto the same factor.
 In contrast, in two data sets collected by Boyle and col-
 leagues (1992), promises and threats are correlated posi-
 tively but have differential effects on relationalism. In this
 meta-analysis, we take the opportunity to reexamine this
 issue and ascertain whether promises and threats have dif-
 ferential effects.
 In contrast to coercive influence strategies, noncoercive
 influence strategies focus "on the beliefs and attitudes of the
 target rather than directly on the target's behavior, and the
 source does not mediate the relationship on the basis of the
 target's response" (Frazier and Rody 1991, p. 58). Noncoer-
 cive influence strategies in channels such as information
 exchange, discussion of business strategies, and requests are
 therefore noncontingent influence strategies. Sometimes
 they are operationalized as the target's perception of the
 quality of assistances offered by the source (Brown, John-
 son, and Koenig 1995). Consistent with the majority of
 research on channel power (e.g., Brown and Frazier 1978;
 Keith, Jackson, and Crosby 1990), we focus on the partner's
 use of power in this article.
 The impact of the partner's use of coercive influence
 strategies. Conflict increases when coercive influence
 strategies are used by the partner (Brown and Frazier 1978;
 Brown, Lusch, and Muehling 1983). When the partner firm
 frequently pressures and coerces the focal channel member
 (using threats and/or promises) into either taking some
 actions that it otherwise would not have taken or forgoing
 some other positive outcomes, the focal channel member is
 expected to feel tension and frustration because its channels
 operations are disrupted and its decision autonomy is con-
 strained (Brown, Lusch, and Muehling 1983). This may
 result in disagreements and conflict (Frazier and Rody
 1991).
 Channel members often perceive some cost in complying
 with their partners' threats (Anderson and Narus 1990), and
 punishments generally decrease the channel member's out-
 comes (Scheer and Stern 1992). Therefore, the use of threats
 by the partner should decrease the focal channel member's
 economic satisfaction. Furthermore, noneconomic satisfac-
 tion should decrease because channel members do not
 appreciate interactions with parties that threaten them.
 The use of promises by the partner firm should enhance
 the focal channel member's economic satisfaction because
 the channel member's outcomes generally increase in case
 of compliance (Busch 1980; Wilkinson 1979). Conversely,
 the use of promises by the partner should decrease the chan-
 nel member's noneconomic satisfaction. When promises are
 used, the focal channel member's intrinsic motivation and
 sense of autonomy are likely to be undermined by the exter-
 nal explanation for the behavior, as will its noneconomic
 satisfaction (Scheer and Stern 1992). As a consequence, it
 will experience lower noneconomic satisfaction (Frazier and
 Summers 1986; Lusch 1977).
 Because the partner's use of threats results in punishment
 (in case of noncompliance), whereas the partner's use of
 promises results in rewards (in case of compliance), it gen-
 227
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Fri, 18 Aug 2017 02:07:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, MAY 1999
 erally is agreed that the use of threats is more coercive than
 the use of promises (Frazier and Summers 1984). Further-
 more, as Beier and Stern (1969) observe, the coercive
 aspects of influence strategies that use reward power, such
 as promises, are subtle, whereas the coercive aspects of
 influence strategies that directly use coercive power, such as
 threats, are blunt and forceful. Therefore, the use of threats
 by the partner will have stronger effects on conflict and
 noneconomic satisfaction than will the use of promises by
 the partner. We propose the following:
 H3: Greater use of threats by the partner fosters (a) higher con-
 flict, (b) lower economic satisfaction, and (c) lower noneco-
 nomic satisfaction.
 H4: Greater use of promises by the partner fosters (a) higher
 conflict, (b) higher economic satisfaction, and (c) lower
 noneconomic satisfaction.
 H5: The use of threats by the partner has stronger effects on con-
 flict and noneconomic satisfaction than the use of promises
 by the partner.
 The impact of the partner's use of noncoercive influence
 strategies. The frequent use of noncoercive influence strate-
 gies by the partner fosters higher levels of agreement on
 business issues in the channel relationship (Frazier and
 Summers 1986), thereby helping alleviate conflict (Frazier
 and Rody 1991; Lusch 1976). Moreover, the use of nonco-
 ercive influence strategies by the partner firm should
 enhance the focal channel member's economic satisfaction
 because the channel member's outcomes generally increase
 when the partner provides it with high quality assistances.
 Furthermore, when noncoercive strategies are relied on
 heavily by the partner, the focal channel member is likely to
 perceive the partner as accomodative, responsive to its con-
 cerns, and willing to work toward solutions to problems
 (Frazier and Rody 1991). As a result, noneconomic satisfac-
 tion increases. We hypothesize the following:
 H6: Greater use of noncoercive influence strategies by the part-
 ner fosters (a) lower conflict, (b) higher economic satisfac-
 tion, and (c) higher noneconomic satisfaction.
 Structure
 In a channel setting, dependence usually is defined as the
 firm's need to maintain the relationship with its partner to
 achieve its goals (Frazier 1983a; Heide and John 1988). It is
 based in the value received by the firm through its relation-
 ship with the partner and the extent to which that partner,
 and the value generated, are irreplaceable (Frazier and Rody
 1991). Centralization is defined as the degree to which deci-
 sion-making authority is concentrated, as opposed to shared,
 within the channel system. Consistent with existing chan-
 nels research on centralization, we focus on centralized
 decision making by the partner firm (Dwyer and Oh 1987a).
 Formalization is the extent to which decision making is reg-
 ulated by explicit rules and procedures (John and Reve
 1982).
 The impact of own dependence. Some research has taken
 the position that those that are dependent on their exchange
 partner will be exploited through the frequent use of coer-
 cive influence strategies by that partner (Kale 1986). As the
 dependence of a channel member on its partner increases,
 that partner faces higher temptations to act opportunistically
 (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1998). It has every impetus
 to use its power and no reason for restraint, because its fear
 of retaliation is low. Thus, it increasingly will take advan-
 tage of the dependent firm by greater use of coercive power
 to gain a disproportionate share of benefits from the
 exchange.
 Most researchers (e.g., Brown and Frazier 1978), how-
 ever, predict that as a channel member's dependence
 increases, its partner will have less need to rely on coercive
 influence tactics. The powerful partner is more likely to be
 meaningful enough to the dependent channel member to
 make effective use of noncoercive strategies and achieve
 compliance without having to resort to the expense of coer-
 cive influence strategies; instead, the partner can reserve its
 coercive influence strategies for when they really are needed
 to obtain compliance (i.e., when noncoercive strategies have
 failed to produce the desired response) (Frazier and Rody
 1991; Frazier and Summers 1986). Therefore, we hypothe-
 size the following:
 H7: Greater levels of own dependence foster (a) lesser use of
 threats by the partner, (b) lesser use of promises by the part-
 ner, and (c) greater use of noncoercive influence strategies
 by the partner.
 The impact of centralization. Centralized decision mak-
 ing (by the partner) fosters the use of threats and promises
 by the partner. In relationships in which the exchange part-
 ner attempts to monopolize interfirm decisions, the focal
 channel member experiences alienation and frustration
 (Dwyer and Oh 1987a; John 1984). This would render the
 use of noncoercive influence strategies, such as information
 exchange and recommendation, less effective (Boyle and
 Dwyer 1995). Instead, the partner must resort to more coer-
 cive forms of influence, including threats and promises, that
 provide the focal channel member with a direct incentive to
 change its behavior. Therefore, we forward the following
 hypothesis:
 H8: Greater levels of centralization in favor of the partner foster
 (a) greater use of threats by the partner, (b) greater use of
 promises by the partner, and (c) lesser use of noncoercive in-
 fluence strategies by the partner.
 The impact of formalization. Formalized transactions
 allow for greater opportunity to use threats and promises as
 forms of influence. Formalized structures exhibit the exten-
 sive use of rules and procedures and traditionally have been
 viewed as having negative effects on those subjected to
 them (John 1984). According to Dwyer and Oh (1987a), for-
 malized structures deter a channel member's sense of auton-
 omy and competence, which in turn reduces its intrinsic
 motivation. Consequently, programs and directives targeted
 toward the focal channel member will be viewed negatively
 or even with suspicion. Again, when credibility in the part-
 ner's message is lacking, the use of noncoercive influence
 strategies such as information exchange and recommenda-
 tion are rendered ineffective, and more coercive forms of
 influence are likely to be used (Boyle and Dwyer 1995). We
 hypothesize the following:
 H9: Greater levels of formalization foster (a) greater use of
 threats by the partner, (b) greater use of promises by the
 partner, and (c) lesser use of noncoercive influence strate-
 gies by the partner.
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 METHOD
 Literature Search
 Empirical studies appearing in the marketing or manage-
 ment literature and reporting on one or more relationships
 between any pair of constructs specified in Figure I were
 identified by means of a computer bibliographic search and
 issue-by-issue searches of the Academy of Management
 Journal, International Journal of Research in Marketing,
 Journal of Business Research, Journal of Consumer
 Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing
 Research, Journal of Retailing, Management Science,
 Marketing Letters, Marketing Science, Strategic
 Management Journal, and the Proceedings of the Academy
 of Management, American Marketing Association, and
 European Marketing Academy. The literature search cov-
 ered the 1970-1996 period.
 In all, 97 empirical articles were uncovered. Four studies
 were excluded because they merely reanalyzed previously
 reported data (e.g., Howell 1987), thereby reducing the
 number of studies to 93. In some studies, data from more
 than one sample were examined (e.g., Anderson and Narus
 1990; Ganesan 1994). Thus, 107 independent samples
 reported in 93 studies formed the basis for our analyses.
 Studies included in our meta-analysis are indicated in the
 reference list by an asterisk (*). All relationships included
 data from at least two samples (Ns = 121-3550), with an
 average total N per relationship of 1277. This is comparable
 to the meta-analyses of Brown and Peterson (1993) and
 Brown and Stayman (1992), which were based on average
 total Ns per relationship of 1811 and 1328, respectively.
 Procedure
 When the set of studies was identified, the sample size
 and the correlations between variables of interest were
 recorded. For studies that did not report correlations,
 Student's t and F ratios with one degree of freedom in the
 numerator were converted to correlation coefficients by
 means of formulas provided by Hunter and Schmidt (1990,
 p. 272).3
 All "harvested" correlations were categorized on the basis
 of the construct operationalizations. In most cases, but not
 all, these coincided with the construct designations
 employed in the studies. We distinguished between eco-
 nomic and noneconomic satisfaction on the basis of the per-
 centage of economic items in the satisfaction measure. Sat-
 isfaction measures containing at least 75% economic items
 were labeled "economic satisfaction," whereas those mea-
 sures containing at most 25% economic items were labeled
 "noneconomic satisfaction." To illustrate, the satisfaction
 constructs included in Brown, Lusch, and Smith's (1991)
 and Wilkinson's (1981) studies were labeled economic sat-
 isfaction because they were measured using predominantly
 economic items (93% and 88%, respectively). Gaski (1986)
 and Andaleeb (1996), conversely, measured satisfaction
 using few, if any, economic items (20% and 0%, respec-
 tively). Their satisfaction constructs were labeled noneco-
 nomic satisfaction.
 The first step of the meta-analysis entailed calculating a
 pooled correlation coefficient for every pair of constructs in
 3The conversion formulas are as follows: r = t/lt2 + N - 2, and r =
 IF//F + N - 2.
 our model, according to the meta-analytic procedures sug-
 gested by Hedges and Olkin (1985). To this extent, z-
 transformed individual study effects were averaged and
 weighted by an estimate of the inverse of their variance (N
 - 3) to give greater weight to more precise estimates. Thus,
 ,(Nk -3)zijk
 (1)  z = k
 ij X(Nk-3)
 k
 where Zijk is the z-transform of the observed correlation
 between construct i and construct j in study k, and Nk is the
 number of respondents in study k. The pooled z-transformed
 study effects then were reconverted to correlation coeffi-
 cients (Hedges and Olkin 1985).4
 The structural equations corresponding to our SCO model
 are depicted in Figure 1. Because the path analysis model is
 recursive, the parameters can be estimated using Ordinary
 Least Squares (OLS) regression (Pedhazur 1982). The
 pooled correlation coefficients constituted the model input
 for OLS.5, 6 The median sample size (N = 999) from the
 meta-analysis of relationships among constructs in the
 model was used in the regression analysis.
 RESULTS
 The meta-analytic correlations appear in Table 1. Table 1
 shows that the average absolute value of the correlations
 among the outcome variables is .478. Some of these average
 correlations are quite large. For example, trust is fairly
 strongly correlated with noneconomic satisfaction (r =
 .767), conflict (r = -.591), and commitment (r = .524).
 These findings suggest that, on average, the outcome vari-
 ables have approximately 23% of their variance in common,
 with the range extending from 9.2% (between conflict and
 noneconomic satisfaction) to as high as 58.8% (between
 trust and noneconomic satisfaction). Table 1 also shows that
 the average correlations among the structure variables (aver-
 age Irl = .186) and among the conduct variables (average
 Irl = .196) are modest.
 Two findings pertaining to the meta-analytic correlations
 involving economic and noneconomic satisfaction deserve
 to be highlighted. First, three variables, namely, partner's
 use of promises, centralization, and formalization, are
 related positively to economic satisfaction but negatively to
 4The conversion formulas are as follows: z = % ln[(l + r)/(l - r)], and r
 =(e2z - l)/(e2z + I).
 5An OLS regression requires that the correlation matrix involved is pos-
 itive definite. Because of the way the correlation matrix is constructed, this
 is not always guaranteed in meta-analysis, but it was not a problem in this
 study.
 6Individual correlations also may be affected by idiosyncratic study char-
 acteristics. We explored this issue in depth for the correlations involving
 our two focal constructs-economic satisfaction and noneconomic satis-
 faction-using Parametric Adjustability (Assmus, Farley, and Lehmann
 1984; Farley, Lehmann, and Sawyer 1995). We examined the effects of
 type of product distribution channel (consumer versus industrial), level of
 integration (franchise versus independent), national culture (power dis-
 tance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism), side of the dyad (buyer ver-
 sus seller), reference frame (experiment versus field study), and publication
 outlet (top-tier journals versus non-top-tier journals versus proceedings),
 while controlling for the specific construct related to economic/noneco-
 nomic satisfaction. In this case, only I out of 17 study characteristic effects
 was significant at the .05 level, which can be expected by chance alone.
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 Table 1
 SUMMARY OF META-ANALYTIC CORRELATIONS
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 Outcomes
 1. Economic satisfaction
 2. Noneconomic satisfaction
 3. Trust
 4. Commitment
 5. Conflict
 Conduct
 6. Partner's use of threats
 7. Partner's use of promises
 8. Partner's use of noncoercive
 influence strategies
 Structure
 9. Own dependence
 10. Centralization
 11. Formalization
 -a
 .393
 5
 472
 .404
 5
 506
 -.407
 14
 831
 -.056
 2
 236
 .120
 4
 121
 .211
 10
 1586
 .055
 5
 443
 .187
 8
 498
 .268
 3
 273
 .767
 7
 1016
 .513
 6
 938
 -.303
 13
 1651
 -.350
 5
 843
 -.216
 4
 690
 .295
 8
 1400
 .146
 6
 1151
 -.182
 5
 832
 -.058
 2
 308
 .524
 11
 2494
 -.591
 12
 2081
 -.423
 3
 914
 -.226
 2
 706
 .337
 4
 1068
 .099
 7
 1070
 -.221
 5
 650
 -.079
 7
 651
 10
 -.401
 11
 2895
 -.303
 4
 1827
 -.033
 4
 1827
 .171
 6
 2902
 .237
 11
 2547
 .251
 3
 981
 .200
 3
 632
 .205
 11
 1609
 .050
 6
 482
 -.054
 14
 3550
 -.088
 9
 2457
 .210
 8
 1043
 -.033
 11
 1732
 .375
 12
 2170
 -.031
 14
 2351
 .096
 3
 504
 .292
 5
 757
 .124
 3
 571
 .182
 10
 2082
 .213
 3
 504
 .271
 4
 682
 .194
 2
 465
 .022
 6
 2061
 .099
 9
 2020
 .281
 4
 696
 .182
 11
 2813
 .111
 6
 1203
 c
 0
 z3
 r-
 0
 -n
 >
 .265 z
 12 )
 2186 D,
 m
 Note: Entries are the weighted average correlation (r) values, the number of correlations obtained for each analysis (k), and the total sample size used for each analysis (N).
 aprimary studies involving satisfaction use either an economic or a noneconomic measure of satisfaction. As a consequence, correlation coefficients between economic and noneconomic satisfaction are not avail lable.
 ro
 m
 m
 0
 I
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 noneconomic satisfaction. Second, most variables exhibit
 stronger correlations with noneconomic satisfaction than
 with economic satisfaction. These two findings provide evi-
 dence for the importance of discriminating between eco-
 nomic and noneconomic satisfaction.
 Noneconomic Satisfaction, Trust, and Commitment:
 Distinct Constructs
 In our meta-analysis, we find weighted mean correlations
 among noneconomic satisfaction, trust, and commitment
 varying between .513 and .767 (see Table 1). Although these
 correlations are substantial, they are significantly (p <
 .0001) different from 1. In addition, if noneconomic satis-
 faction, trust, and commitment are essentially the same con-
 struct, we would expect each of these constructs to have an
 identical pattern of relationships with the various
 antecedents and consequences (Miller and Pollock 1995).
 Examination of Table I reveals that this is not the case. For
 example, conflict has a large negative relation with trust (r =
 -.591, p < .001) and commitment (r = -.401, p < .001) and
 a modest negative relation with noneconomic satisfaction
 (r = -.303, p < .001). Partner's use of promises has a mod-
 est negative relation with noneconomic satisfaction (r =
 -.216, p < .001) and trust (r = -.226, p < .001) and a non-
 significant relation with commitment (r = -.033, p > .10).
 Furthermore, formalization has a modest positive relation
 with commitment (r = .200, p < .001), a small negative rela-
 tion with trust (r = -.079, p < .05), and a nonsignificant rela-
 tion with noneconomic satisfaction (r = -.058, p > .10).
 Thus, HI is supported.
 Satisfaction in a Structure-Conduct-Outcomes Framework
 In Figure 2, we report the results of the OLS regression
 based on effects aggregated across the entire research
 stream. To avoid a clutter of arrows and numbers, only the
 significant parameter estimates are reported.
 Interrelationships among outcome variables. Economic
 satisfaction reduces conflict (,B = -.408, p < .001). Conflict
 influences trust both directly (,B = -.395, p < .001) and indi-
 rectly through noneconomic satisfaction (3 = -.231, p <
 .001). Noneconomic satisfaction has a positive effect on
 trust (P = .646, p < .001), which in turn has a positive effect
 on commitment (3 = .524, p < .001). Therefore, H2ae are
 supported.7
 The effects of relational conduct. The use of threats by
 the partner has a positive effect on the focal channel mem-
 7Our SCO model specifies a one-way causal flow among the outcome
 constructs. One reviewer argued that trust could (also) affect conflict and
 noneconomic satisfaction. A test proposed by Bagozzi (1980; see also
 Brown and Peterson 1993) was used to shed light on this issue. A model
 was estimated specifying reciprocal causation between conflict and trust.
 For identification purposes, we included an additional direct effect of for-
 malization on trust. The reciprocal model was estimated using maximum
 likelihood. It was found that the effect of conflict on trust was significant
 and had the predicted negative valence, whereas the effect of trust on con-
 flict was positive and significant, which makes little sense and is counter to
 prediction. A similar model was estimated specifying reciprocal causation
 between noneconomic satisfaction and trust. To achieve empirical identifi-
 cation, we removed the effect of conflict on noneconomic satisfaction. The
 effect of noneconomic satisfaction on trust was positive and significant,
 whereas the reverse effect was nonsignificant (p > .20). Thus, though the
 analyses are based on cross-sectional data, these findings suggest that con-
 flict and noneconomic satisfaction are causally antecedent to trust, rather
 than the other way around.
 ber's perception of conflict in the relationship (15 = .173, p <
 .001) and negative effects on the focal channel member's
 sense of economic satisfaction (P = -.096, p < .01) and
 noneconomic satisfaction (P = -.227, p < .001). Therefore,
 H3ac are supported.
 The effect of use of promises by the partner on conflict is
 nonsignificant (p > .10). Thus, we find no support for H4a.
 As we hypothesized in H4b and H4, the use of promises by
 the partner has a positive effect on the focal channel mem-
 ber's economic satisfaction (1 = .122, p < .001) and a nega-
 tive effect on the focal channel member's noneconomic sat-
 isfaction (P = -.175, p < .001).
 The use of threats by the partner has a stronger effect on
 conflict (P = .173, p < .001) than the use of promises by the
 partner does (P = .028, p > .10) (t = 2.78, p < .01). The
 effects of the partner's use of threats (P = -.227, p < .001)
 and the partner's use of promises (P1 = -.175, p < .001) on
 noneconomic satisfaction were not significantly different
 from each other (t = 1.05, p > .10), though the difference
 was in the expected direction. Therefore, we find only par-
 tial support for H5.
 Noncoercive influence strategies by the partner had a
 nonsignificant effect on conflict (p > .10) and positive
 effects on the focal channel member's sense of economic
 satisfaction (P = .186, p < .001) and noneconomic satisfac-
 tion (13 = .307, p < .001). Therefore, H6b and H6c are sup-
 ported, but H6a is not.
 The effects of relationship structure. The higher a channel
 member's dependence, the more its partner will turn to the
 use of promises to obtain compliance (1 = .161, p < .001).
 Centralization increases the partner's use of threats and
 promises (13 = .272 and .210, respectively, p < .001), and for-
 malization increases the partner's use of promises and non-
 coercive influence strategies (13 = .121 and .275, respec-
 tively, p < .001). The remaining effects of structure on con-
 duct are nonsignificant (p > .10). Therefore, the results for
 our hypotheses for the effects of structure on conduct are
 mixed. We find support for H8a_b and H9b, but not for H7a_c,
 H8c, H9a, and Hgc.
 Net effects involving satisfaction. The net effects (N.E.) of
 the structure variables on economic and noneconomic satis-
 faction and of economic and noneconomic satisfaction on
 commitment can be calculated on the basis of our model by
 multiplying the appropriate regression coefficients. Overall,
 centralization (N.E. = -.102) and own dependence (N.E. =
 -.043) have negative effects on noneconomic satisfaction
 and small positive effects on economic satisfaction (N.E. =
 .005 and .013, respectively). Formalization increases both
 noneconomic satisfaction (N.E. = .054) and economic satis-
 faction (N.E. = .061). The net effects of both noneconomic
 satisfaction (N.E. = .339) and economic satisfaction (N.E. =
 . 116) on commitment are positive, with the effect of noneco-
 nomic satisfaction being larger.
 DISCUSSION
 Channel member satisfaction has been the most popular
 construct in empirical studies, with 71 studies between 1970
 and 1996 incorporating satisfaction in their model of chan-
 nel relationships. However, the overwhelming emphasis has
 been on developing and testing new theory rather than on
 establishing empirical generalizations. Thus, despite this
 extensive research, no consensus has been established about
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 Figure 2
 ESTIMATES FOR THE SCO MODEL
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 ap <.001.
 bp< .01.
 Note: To avoid a clutter of arrows and numbers, only the significant parameter estimates are reported.
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 the relationships between satisfaction and some of it its
 antecedents and consequences. The problem, as Barwise
 (1995) recently observed, is that though most research in
 marketing is empirical, little of it even attempts to establish
 any generalizations. Given the importance of the construct
 and the current status of research, we systematized and
 quantified all available research evidence and embarked on
 a meta-analysis of the impressive body of evidence on chan-
 nel member satisfaction. A summary of our results appears
 in Table 2. This meta-analysis opens several future research
 issues. However, before we elaborate on the implications for
 further research, we note the limitations of our study.
 Limitations
 First, we recognize that the constructs included in our
 model are only a portion of the potentially relevant variables
 that might have been included. We were constrained in
 selecting those variables that were related most frequently to
 satisfaction and those for which a sufficient number of pri-
 mary studies relating them to the other constructs in the
 model were available. These considerations represent a
 restriction inherent in all models based on matrices of meta-
 analytic correlations. However, as the variables most fre-
 quently studied in relation to channel member satisfaction,
 they are clearly of focal interest to channels researchers, and
 developing empirical generalizations for these variables is
 therefore especially relevant. Moreover, most variables not
 included in our meta-analysis were investigated in such a
 small number of studies that there would be little or no gain
 from quantifying the effects of these variables.
 Second, in the spirit of meta-analysis and to conform to
 mainstream meta-analytical practice, we cumulated similar,
 yet different, constructs into overarching constructs. Per-
 haps the best example of this is with respect to conflict. With
 the exception of manifest conflict, there were not enough
 correlations available involving the individual states of con-
 flict and the other constructs in our model. Therefore, we
 combined latent, perceived, affective, and manifest conflict
 into the overarching construct of "global" conflict. This cat-
 egorization enabled us to derive empirical generalizations
 based on all the available evidence with respect to conflict.
 Reestimation of our SCO model after replacing global con-
 flict with manifest conflict indicated that the results remain
 substantially unaltered.
 Third, generalizations also are bound by context. Univer-
 sality of parameters, perhaps with some inconsequential
 measurement error, is a situation that seldom occurs in prac-
 tice (Farley and Lehmann 1994). Our model did not include
 Table 2
 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
 Expected Regression Hypothesis
 Hypothesized Relationship Effect Coefficient* Supported?
 Hi Noneconomic satisfaction ? Trust r; 1 7.35**.a Yes
 Noneconomic satisfaction ; Commitment r I 15.37**,a
 Trust ? Commitment r ; 1 15.02**,a
 H2a Economic satisfaction -> Conflict - -.408a Yes
 H2b Conflict-> Noneconomic satisfaction - -.23 la Yes
 H2c Conflict -> Trust - -.395a Yes
 H2d Noneconomic satisfaction -> Trust + .646a Yes
 H2e Trust -> Commitment + .524a Yes
 H3a Partner's use of threats - Conflict + .173a Yes
 H3b Partner's use of threats -> Economic satisfaction - -.096h Yes
 H3c Partner's use of threats -> Noneconomic satisfaction - -.227a Yes
 H4a Partner's use of promises -> Conflict + .028 No
 H4b Partner's use of promises-> Economic satisfaction + .122a Yes
 H4c Partner's use of promises -> Noneconomic satisfaction - -. 175a Yes
 H5 Partner's use of threats -- Conflict > 2.78**,b Yes
 versus Partner's use of promises -> Conflict
 Partner's use of threats -> Noneconomic satisfaction > 1.05** No
 versus Partner's use of promises -> Noneconomic satisfaction
 H6a Partner's use of noncoercive influence strategies -> Conflict - .032 No
 H6b Partner's use of noncoercive influence strategies -- Economic satisfaction + .186a Yes
 H .c Partner's use of noncoercive influence strategies -> Noneconomic satisfaction + .307a Yes
 H7a Own dependence-> Partner's use of threats - .041 No
 H7b Own dependence-> Partner's use of promises - .161a No
 H7c Own dependence -> Partner's use of noncoercive influence strategies + -.014 No
 H8a Centralization -> Partner's use of threats + .272a Yes
 H8b Centralization-> Partner's use of promises + .210a Yes
 Hc. Centralization -> Partner's use of noncoercive influence strategies - .029 No
 H9a Formalization -> Partner's use of threats + .047 No
 H9b Formalization-> Partner's use of promises + .121a Yes
 Hg. Formalization -> Partner's use of noncoercive influence strategies - .275a No
 ap < .001.
 bp < .01.
 *Unless otherwise indicated.
 **A t-value is reported.
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 exogenous factors, such as rate of growth or competitive
 intensity in the industry, which may influence the correla-
 tions among the constructs included in the study.
 Fourth, it should be noted that meta-analysis never should
 be considered a substitute for new primary research (Cooper
 and Hedges 1994). Primary research and meta-analysis are
 complementary parts of a programmatic stream of research.
 Primary studies are the basis for meta-analysis, whereas
 periodic meta-analysis can help ensure that the next wave of
 primary research is directed in the most illuminating direc-
 tion. In this spirit, we offer some implications for further
 research.
 Implications for Further Research
 Channel member satisfaction research has been plagued
 by the variety of conceptualizations and instruments that
 have been offered. Overall, based on the accumulated
 research presented here, it appears that the proportion of
 economic items included in the satisfaction scale can lead to
 varying results. The differences between what we classify as
 "economic" and "noneconomic" satisfaction are intriguing
 and have not been addressed in primary channels research.
 With respect to effects of influence strategies on satisfac-
 tion, prior research mostly has maintained that threats and
 promises have negative effects, whereas noncoercive influ-
 ence strategies have positive effects on satisfaction. Our
 meta-analysis indicates that this is true when satisfaction is
 conceptualized as a soft construct and operationalized with
 the noneconomic, emotional aspects of the relationship.
 However, the effects on economic satisfaction are entirely
 different. Because promises presumably deliver rewards to
 the party from the partner, the use of promises by the part-
 ner increases the party's economic satisfaction.
 In contrast, the use of partner threats has a much weaker
 negative effect on the party's economic satisfaction com-
 pared with the party's noneconomic satisfaction. Perhaps
 the effects of threats on economic satisfaction are also
 dependent on the outcomes that result from the behavior
 adopted by the party in compliance with the threat (Scheer
 and Stern 1992). This also may explain why the partner's
 noncoercive influence strategies have a much weaker posi-
 tive effect on economic versus noneconomic satisfaction.
 Although noncoercive influence strategies make the party
 feel good, the economic effects are less obvious. It appears
 that parties are able to distinguish their emotional, or soft,
 relational feelings toward the partner from the economic
 aspects of the business.
 The distinction between satisfaction and trust is less pro-
 nounced when satisfaction is operationalized in noneco-
 nomic as opposed to economic terms. Thus, the concern that
 some researchers have that the constructs of satisfaction and
 trust tap into the same generalized affect toward the partner
 seems to be more relevant in terms of noneconomic satis-
 faction. We can imagine situations in which, despite the lack
 of trust, the parties are satisfied with the economic aspects
 of the relationship. However, it is harder to expect that trust
 exists in the face of dissatisfaction with the relationship on
 noneconomic aspects. Our suggestion for channels research
 is to distinguish clearly between economic and noneco-
 nomic satisfaction.
 On the basis of our meta-analysis, we also can make sug-
 gestions regarding which constructs and relationships
 between constructs are worthy of further attention. Figure 1
 indicates that some relationships have been overresearched,
 and the findings are almost unanimous. The positive rela-
 tionship between trust and commitment falls in this cate-
 gory. If these relationships are pursued empirically in the
 future, it should be only to demonstrate that there may be
 conditions in which these relationships do not hold. For
 example, perhaps in the face of quickly changing market
 conditions, commitment (intention to continue the relation-
 ship) might not exist between trusting channel partners. The
 negative relationship between manifest conflict and noneco-
 nomic satisfaction also is overexamined. It would be more
 useful to study other states of conflict or the functionality of
 conflict. It long has been recognized that conflict within
 channels of distribution can be either functional or dysfunc-
 tional (Frazier 1983a), yet empirical demonstrations of the
 functionality of conflict or when conflict can lead to posi-
 tive relational effects are unknown, to the best of our
 knowledge.
 Figure I also indicates that some relationships, though
 frequently studied, demonstrate mixed results. Because pri-
 mary research has found mixed results for the effects of the
 party's dependence on the use of threats, promises, and non-
 coercive influence strategies, our meta-analysis results for
 the dependence construct are weak (Figure 2). As suggested
 by more recent research (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp
 1995b), it is not the level of unilateral dependence that is
 important but rather total interdependence and relative inter-
 dependence in a relationship. Unfortunately, there were not
 enough correlations between satisfaction and total interde-
 pendence/relative interdependence for our meta-analysis.
 This indicates that the effects of the relational interdepen-
 dence constructs on economic and noneconomic satisfaction
 should be explored. Also, more insight is needed on the role
 of punitive capability in building economic and noneco-
 nomic satisfaction (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1998).
 Some constructs, such as influence strategies, are deserv-
 ing of greater attention, according to our meta-analysis.
 Despite the significant attention given to influence strategies
 in channels research, it appears premature to close the book
 on it. When a factor analysis is conducted, promises and
 threats are correlated positively and load on to the same fac-
 tor. Thus, it seemed reasonable to combine them into a con-
 struct called "coercive influence strategies" (e.g., Frazier
 and Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1984, 1986). How-
 ever, our meta-analysis indicates that, despite the positive
 correlation between threats and promises, the antecedents
 and the consequences of the two strategies are different.
 Thus, we recommend exploring them as distinct influence
 strategies using Boyle and colleagues' (1992) measures.
 The present data suggest that, over time, conflict and sat-
 isfaction will develop first, trust will develop in the medium
 term, and commitment will emerge only in the long term.
 However, these conclusions are based on cross-sectional
 data. In this respect, our meta-analysis suffers from the same
 weakness as the primary studies on which it is based. There
 is an urgent need for longitudinal studies involving the same
 set of firms over an extended period of time. Such research
 would make a great contribution to our understanding of the
 process dynamics and the cumulative effects of individual
 exchange episodes in establishing long-term relationships.
 This would make possible stronger inferences about the
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 development of channels constructs over time, their causal
 sequence, and feedback effects.
 Our review of channel member satisfaction demonstrates
 that channel researchers have devoted considerable attention
 to exploring the main effects between satisfaction and vari-
 ous constructs. Therefore, we recommend that additional
 research should explore more complex interactive patterns
 related to satisfaction. Recently, several articles (e.g.,
 Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a; Mohr, Fisher, and
 Nevin 1996) have demonstrated the effects of interactions
 on commitment. On the basis of this research, it seems that
 some of the more promising interactions on satisfaction may
 be between structure and conduct variables. In addition,
 interaction effects with environmental constructs could be
 explored to establish the conditions in which general rela-
 tionships do not hold.
 For the purposes of efficient design of future research
 studies, it is important to combine several of these sugges-
 tions when planning the next study on channel member sat-
 isfaction. Doing so will maximize the contribution of this
 new study to the improvement of knowledge. Recently, Far-
 ley, Lehmann, and Mann (1998) developed a procedure that
 assists researchers in designing such studies. This procedure
 offers great potential for designing new primary research in
 the channels domain, as well as in other areas of marketing.
 Finally, this article demonstrates that there has been a
 substantial amount of effort in channels research devoted to
 understanding channel member satisfaction. However, in
 contrast, the effects on performance have been relatively
 ignored. From a normative point of view, managers are
 more interested in assessing whether channel members are
 performing, rather than simply focusing on their satisfac-
 tion. In channels research, Gaski and Nevin (1985) find few
 common effects for satisfaction and performance, which
 implies that there is a weak relationship between satisfaction
 and performance. In contrast, Kumar, Stern, and Achrol
 (1992) observe substantial correlations between perceptual
 measures of performance and satisfaction but marginal asso-
 ciations between archival measures of performance and sat-
 isfaction. There is a considerable need to assess the perfor-
 mance implications of various channel structures and strate-
 gies. We urge channels researchers to do so.
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 keting Science, 14 (3), G29-35.
 Beier, Frederick J. and Louis W. Stem (1969), "Power in the Channel
 of Distribution," in Distribution Channels: Behavioral Dimen-
 sions, Louis W. Stem, ed. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 92-116.
 Boyle, Brett A. and F. Robert Dwyer (1995), "Power, Bureaucracy,
 Influence, and Performance: Their Relationships in Industrial
 Distribution Channels," Journal of Business Research, 32 (3),
 189-200. (*)
 , Robert A. Robicheaux, and James T. Simpson
 (1992), "Influence Strategies in Marketing Channels: Measures
 and Use in Different Relationship Structures," Journal of Mar-
 keting Research, 29 (November), 462-73. (*)
 Brown, James R. and Ralph L. Day (1981), "Measures of Manifest
 Conflict in Distribution Channels," Journal of Marketing
 Research, 18 (August), 263-74. (*)
 and Gary L. Frazier (1978), "The Application of Channel
 Power: Its Effects and Connotations," in AMA Summer Educa-
 tors' Conference Proceedings. Chicago: American Marketing
 Association, 266-70. (*)
 , Jean L. Johnson, and Harold F. Koenig (1995), "Measur-
 ing the Sources of Marketing Channel Power: A Comparison of
 Alternative Approaches," International Journal of Research in
 Marketing, 12 (4), 333-54. (*)
 , Robert F. Lusch, and Darrel D. Muehling (1983), "Con-
 flict and Power-Dependence Relations in Retailer-Supplier
 Channels," Journal of Retailing, 59 (4), 53-80. (*)
 , , and Carolyn Y. Nicholson (1995), "Power and
 Relationship Commitment: Their Impact on Marketing Channel
 Member Performance," Journal of Retailing, 71 (4), 363-92. (*)
 ), , and Laurie P. Smith (1991), "Conflict and Satis-
 faction in an Industrial Channel of Distribution," International
 Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Management, 21
 (6), 15-26. (*)
 Brown, Steven P. and Robert A. Peterson (1993), "Antecedents and
 Consequences of Salesperson Job Satisfaction: Meta-Analysis
 and Assessment of Causal Effects," Journal of Marketing
 Research, 30 (February), 63-77.
 and Douglas M. Stayman (1992), "Antecedents and Con-
 sequences of Attitude Toward the Ad: A Meta-Analysis," Jour-
 nal of Consumer Research, 19 (June), 34-51.
 Busch, Paul (1980), 'The Sales Manager's Bases of Social Power
 and Influence Upon the Sales Force," Journal of Marketing, 44
 (Summer), 91-101.
 and David T. Wilson (1976), "An Experimental Analysis of
 a Salesman's Expert and Referent Bases of Social Power in the
 Buyer-Seller Dyad," Journal of Marketing Research, 13 (Feb-
 ruary), 3-11. (*)
 Childers, Terry L., Robert W. Ruekert, and David M. Boush (1984),
 "Assessment of the Psychometric Properties of Alternative Mea-
 sures of Cooperation and its Antecedents Within Marketing
 Channels," in AMA Summer Educators' Conference Proceed-
 ings. Chicago: American Marketing Association, 256-60. (*)
 Cooper, Harris and Larry V. Hedges (1994), "Potentials and Limi-
 tations of Research Synthesis," in The Handbook of Research
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 Synthesis, Harris Cooper and Larry V. Hedges, eds. New York:
 Russell Sage Foundation, 521-29.
 Cronin, J. Joseph, Jr., Thomas L. Baker, and Jon M. Hawes (1994),
 "An Assessment of the Role Performance Measurement of
 Power-Dependency in Marketing Channels," Journal of Busi-
 ness Research, 30 (3), 201-10. (*)
 Crosby, Lawrence A., Kenneth R. Evans, and Deborah Cowles
 (1990), "Relationship Quality in Services Selling: An Interper-
 sonal Influence Perspective," Journal of Marketing, 54 (July),
 68-81. (*)
 Dahlstrom, Robert and Arne Nygaard (1995), "An Exploratory
 Investigation of Interpersonal Trust in New and Mature Market
 Economies," Journal of Retailing, 71 (4), 339-61. (*)
 Dwyer, F. Robert (1980), "Channel-Member Satisfaction: Labora-
 tory Insights," Journal of Retailing, 56 (2), 45-65. (*)
 and Jule B. Gassenheimer (1992), "Relational Roles and
 Triangle Dramas: Effects on Power Play and Sentiments in
 Industrial Channels," Marketing Letters, 3 (2), 187-200. (*)
 and Richard H. Kolbe (1984), "On the Measurement of
 Interorganizational Decision Structure Properties," in AMA
 Summer Educators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago: Ameri-
 can Marketing Association, 261-65. (*)
 and Sejo Oh (1986), 'The Effects of Environmental
 Munificence on Channel Member Relations," in AMA Summer
 Educators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago: American Mar-
 keting Association, 195-200. (*)
 and (1987a), "Output Sector Munificence Effects
 on the Internal Political Economy of Marketing Channels,"
 Journal of Marketing Research, 24 (November), 347-58. (*)
 and (1987b), 'The Consequences of Intertype
 Competition on Retail and Interfirm Behavior," in AMA Summer
 Educators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago: American Mar-
 keting Association, 23-28. (*)
 and (1988), "A Transaction Cost Perspective on
 Vertical Contractual Structure and Interchannel Competitive
 Strategies," Journal of Marketing, 52 (April), 21-34. (*)
 , Paul H. Schurr, and Sejo Oh (1987), "Developing
 Buyer-Seller Relationships," Journal of Marketing, 51 (April),
 11-27.
 Farley, John U. and Donald R. Lehmann (1986), Meta-Analysis in
 Marketing: Generalization of Response Models. Lexington,
 MA: Lexington Books.
 and (1994), "Cross-National 'Laws' and Differ-
 ences in Market Response," Management Science, 40 (1),
 111-22.
 , and Lane H. Mann (1998), "Designing the Next
 Study for Maximum Impact," Journal of Marketing Research,
 35 (November), 496-501.
 , and Alan Sawyer (1995), "Empirical Marketing
 Generalization Using Meta-Analysis," Marketing Science, 14
 (3), G36-46.
 Frazier, Gary L. (I 983a), "On the Measurement of Interfirm Power
 in Channels of Distribution," Journal of Marketing Research, 20
 (May), 158-66. (*)
 (1983b), "Interorganizational Exchange Behavior in Mar-
 keting Channels: A Broadened Perspective," Journal of Market-
 ing, 47 (Fall), 68-78.
 , James D. Gill, and Sudhir H. Kale (1989), "Dealer Depen-
 dence Levels and Reciprocal Actions in a Channel of Distribu-
 tion in a Developing Country," Journal of Marketing, 53 (Janu-
 ary), 50-69. (*)
 and Walfried M. Lassar (1996), "Determinants of Distrib-
 ution Intensity," Journal of Marketing, 60 (October), 39-51. (*)
 and Raymond C. Rody (1991), 'The Use of Influence
 Strategies in Interfirm Relationships in Industrial Product Chan-
 nels," Journal of Marketing, 55 (January), 52-69. (*)
 and John O. Summers (1984), "Interfirm Influence Strate-
 gies and Their Application Within Distribution Channels," Jour-
 nal of Marketing, 48 (Summer), 43-55. (*)
 and (1986), "Perceptions of Interfirm Power and
 Its Use Within a Franchise Channel of Distribution," Journal of
 Marketing Research, 23 (May), 169-76. (*)
 French, John R.P. and Bertram Raven (1959), "The Bases of Social
 Power," in Studies in Social Power, Dorwin Cartwright, ed. Ann
 Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 150-67.
 Ganesan, Shankar (1993), "Negotiation Strategies and the Nature
 of Channel Relationships," Journal of Marketing Research, 30
 (May), 183-203. (*)
 (1994), "Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in
 Buyer-Seller Relationships," Journal of Marketing, 58 (April),
 1-19. (*)
 Gaski, John F. (1985), "Supplier Actions as Intrachannel Commu-
 nications: Impact on Dealer Perceptions," in AMA Winter Edu-
 cators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago: American Marketing
 Association, 22-26. (*)
 (1986), "Interrelations Among a Channel Entity's Power
 Sources: Impact of the Exercise of Reward and Coercion on
 Expert, Referent, and Legitimate Power Sources," Journal of
 Marketing Research, 23 (February), 62-77. (*)
 (1988), "Distribution Channels: A Validation Study," Inter-
 national Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Man-
 agement, 18 (5), 16-33. (*)
 and John R. Nevin (1985), 'The Differential Effects of
 Exercised and Unexercised Power Sources in a Marketing Chan-
 nel," Journal of Marketing Research, 22 (May), 130-42. (*)
 Gassenheimer, Jule B., Roger J. Calantone, Judith M. Schmitz, and
 Robert A. Robicheaux (1994), "Models of Channel Mainte-
 nance: What Is the Weaker Party to Do?" Journal of Business
 Research, 30 (3), 225-36. (*)
 and Rosemary Ramsey (1994), "The Impact of Dependence
 on Dealer Satisfaction: A Comparison of Reseller-Supplier Rela-
 tionships," Journal of Retailing, 70 (3), 253-66. (*)
 , Jay U. Sterling, and Robert A. Robicheaux (1989), "Long-
 Term Channel Member Relationships," International Journal of
 Physical Distribution and Materials Management, 19 (12),
 15-28. (*)
 Geyskens, Inge, Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp, and Nirmalya
 Kumar (1998), "Generalizations About Trust in Marketing
 Channel Relationships Using Meta-Analysis," International
 Journal of Research in Marketing, 15 (3), 223-48.
 , , Lisa K. Scheer, and Nirmalya Kumar (1996),
 "The Effects of Trust and Interdependence on Relationship
 Commitment: A Trans-Atlantic Study," International Journal of
 Research in Marketing, 13 (4), 303-17. (*)
 Gronhaug, Kjell and Sven A. Haugland (1988), "Perceived Trust
 and Formalization in International Market Relationships," Pro-
 ceedings of the /7th Annual Conference of the European Mar-
 keting Academy, Keith Blois and Stephen Parkinson, eds. Brad-
 ford, England: European Marketing Academy, 248-69. (*)
 Gundlach, Gregory T. and Ernest R. Cadotte (1994), "Exchange
 Interdependence and Interfirm Interaction: Research in a Simu-
 lated Channel Setting," Journal of Marketing Research, 31
 (November), 516-32. (*)
 Hedges, Larry V. and Ingram Olkin (1985), Statistical Methods for
 Meta-Analysis. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
 Heide, Jan B. and George John (1988), 'The Role of Dependence
 Balancing in Safeguarding Transaction-Specific Assets in Con-
 ventional Channels," Journal of Marketing, 52 (January), 20-35.
 and Anne S. Miner (1992), 'The Shadow of the Future:
 Effects of Anticipated Interaction and Frequency of Contact on
 Buyer-Seller Cooperation," Academy of Management Journal,
 35 (2), 265-91. (*)
 Howell, Roy D. (1987), "Covariance Structure Modeling and Mea-
 surement Issues: A Note on 'Interrelations Among a Channel
 Entity's Power Sources'," Journal of Marketing Research, 24
 (February), 119-26.
 Hunt, Kenneth A., John T. Mentzer, and Jeffrey E. Danes (1987),
 "The Effect of Power Sources on Compliance in a Channel of
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 Distribution: A Causal Model," Journal of Business Research,
 15 (October), 377-95. (*)
 Hunt, Shelby D. and John R. Nevin (1974), "Power in a Channel
 of Distribution: Sources and Consequences," Journal of Mar-
 keting Research, 11 (May), 186-93. (*)
 Hunter, John E. and Frank L. Schmidt (1990), Methods of Meta-
 Analysis: Correcting Error and Bias in Research Findings.
 Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
 John, George (1984), "An Empirical Investigation of Some
 Antecedents of Opportunism in a Marketing Channel," Journal
 of Marketing Research, 21 (August), 278-89. (*)
 and Torger Reve (1982), "The Reliability and Validity of
 Key Informant Data from Dyadic Relationships in Marketing
 Channels," Journal of Marketing Research, 19 (November),
 517-24. (*)
 Johnson, Jean L., Harold F. Koenig, and James R. Brown (1987),
 "The Bases of Marketing Channel Power: An Exploration and
 Confirmation of their Underlying Dimensions," in AMA Winter
 Educators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago: American Mar-
 keting Association, 160-65. (*)
 Kale, Sudhir H. (1986), "Dealer Perceptions of Manufacturer
 Power and Influence Strategies in a Developing Country," Jour-
 nal of Marketing Research, 23 (November), 387-93. (*)
 Keith, Janet E., Donald W. Jackson Jr., and Lawrence A. Crosby
 (1990), "Effects of Alternative Types of Influence Strategies
 Under Different Channel Dependence Structures," Journal of
 Marketing, 54 (July), 30-41. (*)
 Krapfel, Robert E. and Robert Spekman (1987), "Channel Power
 Sources, Satisfaction and Performance: An Exploration," in
 AMA Summer Educators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago:
 American Marketing Association, 30-34. (*)
 Kumar, Nirmalya (1996), 'The Power of Trust in Manufac-
 turer-Retailer Relationships," Harvard Business Review, 74
 (November/December), 92-106.
 , Lisa K. Scheer, and Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp
 (1995a), 'The Effects of Supplier Fairness on Vulnerable
 Resellers," Journal of Marketing Research, 32 (February),
 54-65. (*)
 , and (1995b), 'The Effects of Perceived
 Interdependence on Dealer Attitudes," Journal of Marketing
 Research, 32 (August), 348-56. (*)
 , and (1998), "Interdependence, Punitive
 Capability, and the Reciprocation of Punitive Actions in Chan-
 nel Relationships," Journal of Marketing Research, 35 (May),
 225-35.
 , Louis W. Stern, and Ravi S. Achrol (1992), "Assessing
 Reseller Performance from the Perspective of the Supplier,"
 Journal of Marketing Research, 29 (May), 238-53.
 Leuthesser, Lance and Ajay K. Kohli (1995), "Relational Behavior
 in Business Markets," Journal of Business Research, 34 (3),
 221-33. (*)
 Lewis, Christine M. and Douglas M. Lambert (1991), "A Model of
 Channel Member Performance, Dependence, and Satisfaction,"
 Journal of Retailing, 67 (2), 205-25. (*)
 Lusch, Robert F. (1976), "Sources of Power: Their Impact on
 Intrachannel Conflict," Journal of Marketing Research, 13
 (November), 382-90. (*)
 (1977), "Franchisee Satisfaction: Causes and Conse-
 quences," International Journal of Physical Distribution, 7 (3),
 128-40. (*)
 and James R. Brown (1982), "A Modified Model of Power
 in the Marketing Channel," Journal of Marketing Research, 19
 (August), 312-23. (*)
 and (1996), "Interdependency, Contracting, and
 Relational Behavior in Marketing Channels," Journal of Mar-
 keting, 60 (October), 19-38. (*)
 Mehta, Rajiv, Trina Larsen, and Bert Rosenbloom (1996), 'The
 Influence of Leadership Style on Co-operation in Channels of
 Distribution," International Journal of Physical Distribution
 and Logistics Management, 26 (6), 32-59. (*)
 Michie, Donald A. (1978), "Managerial Tactics: An Alternative
 Explanation of Warranty Satisfaction in a Channel of Distribu-
 tion," in AMA Summer Educators' Conference Proceedings.
 Chicago: American Marketing Association, 260-65. (*)
 Miller, Norman and Vicki E. Pollock (1995), "Meta-Analytic Syn-
 thesis for Theory Development," in The Handbook of Research
 Synthesis, Harris Cooper and Larry V. Hedges, eds. New York:
 Russell Sage Foundation, 457-83.
 Mohr, Jakki J., Robert J. Fisher, and John R. Nevin (1996), "Col-
 laborative Communication in Interfirm Relationships: Moderat-
 ing Effects of Integration and Control," Journal of Marketing,
 60 (July), 103-15. (*)
 and John Nevin (1990), "Communication Strategies in
 Marketing Channels: A Theoretical Perspective," Journal of
 Marketing, 54 (October), 36-51.
 and Robert Spekman (1994), "Characteristics of Partner-
 ship Success: Partnership Attributes, Communication Behavior,
 and Conflict Resolution Techniques," Strategic Management
 Journal, 15 (2), 135-52. (*)
 Molm, Linda D. (1990), "Structure, Action, and Outcomes: The
 Dynamics of Power in Social Exchange," American Sociologi-
 cal Review, 55 (3), 427-47.
 Morgan, Robert M. and Shelby D. Hunt (1994), 'The Commit-
 ment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing," Journal of Mar-
 keting, 58 (July), 20-38. (*)
 Olsen, Janeen E. and Kent L. Granzin (1993), "Using Channels
 Constructs to Explain Dealers' Willingness to Help Manufactur-
 ers Combat Counterfeiting," Journal of Business Research, 27
 (2), 147-70. (*)
 Pedhazur, Elazar J. (1982), Multiple Regression in Behavioral
 Research. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
 Phillips, Lynn W. (1981), "Assessing Measurement Error in Key
 Informant Reports: A Methodological Note on Organizational
 Analysis in Marketing," Journal of Marketing Research, 18
 (November), 385-415. (*)
 (1982), "Explaining Control Losses in Corporate Market-
 ing Channels: An Organizational Analysis," Journal of Market-
 ing Research, 19 (November), 525-49. (*)
 Ping, Robert (1990), "Buyer-Seller Relationship Termination: A
 Review and an Experiment," in AMA Winter Educators' Confer-
 ence Proceedings. Chicago: American Marketing Association,
 102-108. (*)
 (1991), "Exit Attenuation in Channel Relationships: The
 Contingent Effects of Satisfaction on Structural Constraints," in
 AMA Winter Educators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago:
 American Marketing Association, 65-71. (*)
 (1993), "The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Con-
 straints on Retailer Exiting, Voice, Loyalty, Opportunism, and
 Neglect," Journal of Retailing, 69 (3), 320-52. (*)
 (1995), "Some Uninvestigated Antecedents of Retailer Exit
 Intention," Journal of Business Research, 34 (3), 171-80. (*)
 Porter, Lyman W., Richard M. Steers, Richard T. Mowday, and
 Paul V. Boulian (1974), "Organizational Commitment, Job Sat-
 isfaction, and Turnover Among Psychiatric Technicians," Jour-
 nal of Applied Psychology, 59 (5), 603-609.
 Price, Retha A. (1991), "An Investigation of Path-Goal Leadership
 Theory in Marketing Channels," Journal of Retailing, 67 (3),
 339-61. (*)
 Provan, Keith G. and Steven J. Skinner (1989), "Interorganiza-
 tional Dependence and Control as Predictors of Opportunism in
 Dealer-Supplier Relations," Academy of Management Journal,
 32 (1), 202-12. (*)
 Rempel, John K., John G. Holmes, and Mark P. Zanna (1985),
 "Trust in Close Relationships," Journal of Personality and
 Social Psychology, 49 (1), 95-112.
 Rose, Randall L. and Murray Young (1991), "Competitive Versus
 Cooperative Motives in Buyer-Seller Negotiations," in AMA
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 Summer Educators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago: Ameri-
 can Marketing Association, 618-25. (*)
 Rosenberg, Larry J. and Louis W. Stem (1971), "Conflict Mea-
 surement in the Distribution Channel," Journal of Marketing
 Research, 8 (November), 437-42. (*)
 Ruekert, Robert W. and Gilbert A. Churchill Jr. (1984), "Reliabil-
 ity and Validity of Alternative Measures of Channel Member
 Satisfaction," Journal of Marketing Research, 21 (May),
 226-33.
 Scheer, Lisa K. and Louis W. Stem (1992), "The Effect of Influ-
 ence Type and Performance Outcomes on Attitude Toward the
 Influencer," Journal of Marketing Research, 29 (February),
 128-42. (*)
 Schul, Patrick L. and Emin Babakus (1988), "An Examination of
 the Interfirm Power-Conflict Relationship: The Intervening
 Role of the Channel Decision Structure," Journal of Retailing,
 64 (4), 381-404. (*)
 , Charles W. Lamb Jr., and Taylor E. Little Jr. (1981), "A
 Path Analysis of the Intrachannel Conflict Process," in AMA
 Summer Educators' Conference Proceedings. Chicago: Ameri-
 can Marketing Association, 39-42. (*)
 , Taylor E. Little, and William M. Pride (1985), "Channel
 Climate: Its Impact on Channel Members' Satisfaction," Journal
 of Retailing, 61 (2), 9-38.
 , William M. Pride, and T.L. Little (1983), "The Impact of
 Channel Leadership Behavior on Intrachannel Conflict," Jour-
 nal of Marketing, 47 (Summer), 21-34. (*)
 Schurr, Paul H. and Julie L. Ozanne (1985), "Influences on
 Exchange Processes: Buyers' Preconceptions of a Seller's Trust-
 worthiness and Bargaining Toughness," Journal of Consumer
 Research, 11 (March), 939-53. (*)
 Skinner, Steven J., Jule B. Gassenheimer, and Scott W. Kelley
 (1992), "Cooperation in Supplier-Dealer Relations," Journal of
 Retailing, 68 (2), 175-93. (*)
 and Joseph P. Guiltinan (1985), "Perceptions of Channel
 Control," Journal of Retailing, 61 (4), 65-88. (*)
 Smith, Michael F. (1993), "A Descriptive Study of
 Franchisor-Franchisee Working Relationships: Implications for
 Small Business Management," in AMA Summer Educators'
 Conference Proceedings. Chicago: American Marketing Associ-
 ation, 417-23. (*)
 Stem, Louis W., Brian Stemthal, and C. Samuel Craig (1973),
 "Managing Conflict in Distribution Channels: A Laboratory
 Study," Journal of Marketing Research, 10 (May), 169-79. (*)
 Venkatraman, N. and Ellen Christiaanse (1996), "Electronic Chan-
 nels for Expertise Exploitation: An Empirical Test of
 Airline-Travel Agency Relationships," Academy of Manage-
 ment Proceedings, 318-22. (*)
 Wilkinson, lan F. (1979), "Power and Satisfaction in Channels of
 Distribution," Journal of Retailing, 55 (2), 79-94. (*)
 (1981), "Power, Conflict, and Satisfaction in Distribution
 Channels-An Empirical Study," International Journal of Phys-
 ical Distribution and Materials Management, 11 (7), 20-30. (*)
 Williams, Larry J. and John T. Hazer (1986), "Antecedents and
 Consequences of Satisfaction and Commitment in Turnover
 Models: A Reanalysis Using Latent Variable Structural Equation
 Models," Journal of Applied Psychology, 71 (2), 219-31.
 Yavas, Ugur and Ghazi Habib (1987), "Correlates of Franchisee
 Satisfaction: The Case of Saudi Car Dealers," International
 Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Management, 17
 (3), 46-55. (*)
 Young, Joyce A., Faye W. Gilbert, and Faye S. McIntyre (1996),
 "An Investigation of Relationalism Across a Range of Market-
 ing Relationships and Alliances," Journal of Business Research,
 35 (2), 139-51. (*)
 *Studies included in the meta-analysis are indicated by an aster-
 isk (*).
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